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NOTE
CAVEAT EMPTOR IS ALIVE AND WELL
AND LIVING IN NEW JERSEY:
A NEW DISCLOSURE STATUTE
INADEQUATELY PROTECTS RESIDENTIAL
BUYERS
Robert H. Shisler*
F or most American families, the purchase of a new home is the
most significant investment they will ever make.' The purchas-
ing process is full of decisions ranging from size and price range to
the kind of neighborhood and location desired.2 If the family has
children, the quality of area schools may be another important
factor. Still, other considerations may include proximity to high-
ways, mass transportation, and shopping and recreation areas.
Most prospective buyers would also like to know whether the
home they plan to purchase was built next door to a leaking toxic
waste dump, or whether a large dirt pile situated in a neighborhood
lot was contaminated with lethal thorium.3 The question in such
residential real estate transactions is who should bear the burden of
discovering and disclosing the presence of such off-site
environmental hazards.
*J.D. Candidate, 1997, Fordham Law School.
1. In re Opinion No. 26 of the Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of
Law, 654 A.2d 1344, 1346 (N.J. 1995).
2. One court has noted that "location is the universal benchmark of the value
and desirability of property." Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d 420, 431-32 (N.J.
1995) [hereinafter cited as Strawn II].
3. See, e.g., Bruno Tedeschi, Know thy Neighborhood N.J. Requires Disclo-
sure of Hazards, THE BERGEN RECORD, Sept. 24, 1995, at R1.
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Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court placed this
responsibility on the seller of new residential housing.4 The court
held that due to the professional seller's recognized advantage in
knowledge and expertise, she must disclose to the buyer the
presence of all "material off-site conditions" such as a closed,
leaking toxic waste dump located next door.5
This extension of the common-law duty to disclose material
latent defects in the sale of residential real estate to off-site condi-
tions is the latest shift in a modem judicial trend of protecting the
buyer in such transactions.6 The ancient doctrine of caveat emptor,
or "let the buyer beware,"7 has steadily gone by the wayside as
courts have recognized the modem realities of the residential real
estate marketplace.' Accordingly, courts have imposed on the seller
such common-law creations as the implied warranty of habitability
and the duty to disclose material latent defects to the buyer.9
New Jersey's highest court recently continued this trend of
protecting the buyer at the expense of the seller by extending the
duty to disclose explicitly to physical conditions that exist off-
site.1° However, because of vagueness in the decision relating to
both the scope and nature of the new duty, the New Jersey
Legislature, besieged by industry," responded with a completely
novel approach and rewrote the duty to disclose in the off-site
context. 12
The New Residential Construction Off-Site Conditions Disclosure
Act 3 (the "Statute") approaches the problem of off-site defects
from a completely different angle than the judiciary. It creates a
public repository of information about the location and the nature
of certain off-site defects deemed by the statute to be "material
4. See Strawn II, 657 A.2d 420.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 426-27.
7. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 222 (6th ed. 1990) ("The purchaser must
examine, judge, and test for himself.").
8. See Strawn II, 657 A.2d at 426.
9. See id. at 426-27.
10. Id. See discussion infra Part II.
11. See Tedeschi, supra note 3.
12. See opening "Statement" 1995 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 253 (West).
13. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3C-1 to -12 (West 1996).
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conditions."' 4 The new duty, then, is not to disclose the presence
and location of such off-site conditions, but merely to disclose that
the public repository exists. 5 This new scheme however, is prob-
lematic because it may not reach all instances of a sellers'
nondisclosure, 6 and may create a vehicle for sellers to shield
themselves from liability for nondisclosure through technical
compliance with the statute.'7 Balanced against this potential for
abuse are the advantages entailed in the centralization of
information regarding certain fixed environmental hazards in the
community.
This Note will cover the early rule of caveat emptor and trace the
development of the modem rule, and the response to it by the
legislature. Part One will briefly trace the evolution from the
ancient doctrine of caveat emptor to the modem rule, generally
using New Jersey law to exemplify the change. Part Two will
examine in detail the modem rule as embodied in Strawn v.
Canuso,8 a New Jersey case that explicitly extended the duty to
disclose to conditions that occur beyond the property line. Part Two
will also examine the problems with the Strawn decision, and
hence, the reasons why New Jersey's Legislature felt that a new
Statute was needed. Part Three will examine the Statute, and detail
its express purpose and function. Part Three will also examine the
effect of the new Statute on the Seller/Buyer relationship, and
whether it lives up to its express purpose. This Note will conclude
by arguing that the current Statute is fatally flawed in several
important respects, and will suggest specific improvements.
PART ONE: THE RISE AND FALL OF CAVEAT EMPTOR
At ancient common law, most real estate transactions were arms-
length between two similarly situated parties with comparable bar-
gaining power. 9 In the agrarian setting, the land itself was far
14. Id. § 46:3C-4 (West 1996).
15. Id. § 46:3C-8 (West 1996).
16. See, e.g., Reed v. King, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1983); Strawn II, 657 A.2d at
430 (N.J. 1995); Michael A. O'Hara, The Utilization of Caveat Emptor in
CERCLA Private Party Cleanups, 56 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 149 (Winter
1993).
17. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3C-1 to -12 (West 1996).
18. Strawn 1I, 657 A.2d 420 (N.J. 1995).
19. Walter H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J.
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more important than any simple buildings or other improvements it
might have contained,"0 and the buyer was expected to inspect the
property for its suitability for his particular intended use.2 Both
the buyer and seller were generally farmers with similar levels of
bargaining power 2 and the. availability of the seller's defense of
caveat emptor created a heavy incentive for the buyer to fully in-
spect the property23 because representations and obligations made
to the buyer integrated with the deed upon delivery.24
Caveat emptor, or "let the buyer beware," was the rule." As the
New Jersey Supreme Court has stated, "the principle of caveat
emptor dictates that in the absence of an express agreement, a seller
is not liable to the buyer or others for the condition of the land
existing at the time of transfer."26 Thus, for used homes, there was
no duty to disclose on-site material defects "no matter how morally
1133 (1931); see also, infra note 22. "[A]rm's length transaction" has been de-
scribed as one between two parties with roughly equal bargaining power and
comparable skill and experience. Frickel v. Sunnyside Enter., Inc., 725 P.2d 422,
425 (Wash. 1986).
20. See, e.g., Green v. Superior Court, 517 P.2d 1168, 1172 (Cal. 1974)
("[Tihe land itself was by far the most important element of a lease transac-
tion."). For a complete history of caveat emptor, see generally, Hamilton, supra
note 19, at 1133.
21. See, e.g., Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 312-13
(3d Cir. 1985).
22. See Hamilton, supra note 19, at 1157.
23. See O'Hara, supra note 16.
24. The common law rule of merger by deed provides that upon delivery of
the deed, all other promises contained in earlier agreements are terminated. See
Paul Teich, A Second Call for Abolition of the Rule of Merger by Deed, 71 U.
DET. MERCY L. REv. 543 (1994). Some have observed that this is merely an
extension of the "integration doctrine" under which "all prior documents are
considered [to have been] integrated into the final contract, and only the provi-
sions contained in the final contract are part of the agreement." 6A RICHARD R.
POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 901 ld at 81A-157
(1992).
25. See Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 317 A.2d 68 (N.J. 1974); Schipper v. Levitt
& Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314 (N.J. 1965); Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc., 140
A.2d 199 (N.J. 1958); Levy v. C. Young Constr. Co., 134 A.2d 717 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Levy I].
26. T&E Indus. v. Safety Light Corp., 587 A.2d 1249, 1257 (N.J. 1991) (cit-
ing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 352 comment (a) (1977)).
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censurable such silence might be,""7 and for new homes, no im-
plied warranty of habitability or fitness existed." If the buyer later
discovered any latent defects, she had no recourse unless she had
protected herself by negotiating express warranties into the deed.29
The real estate marketplace however, has evolved from this
agrarian context into a modem setting, where mass developers build
dozens of homes at one time, and sell the homes to buyers using
standardized form contracts.30 In these transactions, the build-
er/seller negotiates with a distinct advantage over the buyer3" be-
cause the buyer relies upon the knowledge and expertise of the
builder/seller. 2 Furthermore, since the builder/seller is the one
who actually built the homes, superior knowledge about the struc-
ture, property, and surrounding areas is obviously conferred.33 The
standardized form contracts which the builder/seller often uses
offers little room for bargaining.34 Finally, in cases where housing
is in short supply, other potential buyers may be waiting in line for
the opportunity to submit an offer for the same house, presenting
the purchaser with a "take it or leave it" situation. In recognition of
this modem state of affairs, courts have moved to protect the buyer.
This protection has come in the form of a duty to disclose material
27. Peek v. Gurney, L.R. 6 H.L. 377 (1873).
28. Levy v. C. Young Constr. Co., 139 A.2d 738 (N.J. 1958) [hereinafter
cited as Levy II].
29. McDonald v. Mianecki, 398 A.2d 1283 (N.J. 1979).
30. See Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 317 A.2d 68 (N.J. 1974).
31. Id.
32. McDonald, 398 A.2d at 1289.
33. House v. Thorton, 457 P.2d 199, 204 (Wash. 1969) ("[Builder's] position
throughout the process of [site] selection, planning and construction was marked-
ly superior to that of their firs.t purchaser-occupant.").
34. McDonald, 398 A.2d at 1292 ("[B]uilders utilize standard form contracts,
and hence the opportunity to bargain for protective clauses is by and large nonex-
istent."); James J. Knappenberger, Extension of Implied Warranties to Developer-
Vendors of Completed New Homes, 11 URB. L. ANN. 257, 260 (1976) (Standard
form contracts are generally utilized and "[e]xpress warranties are rarely given,
expensive, and impractical for most buyers to negotiate."). For the proposition
that builder-vendors generally enjoy superior bargaining position, see, e.g., Weeks
v. Slavick Builders, Inc., 180 N.W.2d 503 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970); Note, The
Doctrine of Caveat Emptor as Applied to Both the Leasing and Sale of Real
Property: The Need for Reappraisal and Reform, 2 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 120, 136-37
(1970).
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latent defects35 and an implied warranty of habitability.36
The implied warranty of habitability and the seller's duty to
disclose all known latent material defects collectively represent a
vast shift in the burden from the buyer to the seller.37 Courts are
interjecting into common real estate transactions the seller's im-
plied representations that the house is fit for habitation and that
both parties have all information pertinent to the transaction. This is
especially true of information about defects which affect health or
safety,38 but also includes information that merely affects value.39
The extent to which the buyer is protected is illustrated by the
cases granting rescission even when the contract of sale contains an
"as is" clause.'
35. Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 317 A.2d 68 (N.J. 1974).
36. McDonald, 398 A.2d at 1288. The implied warranty of habitability is
sometimes referred to under the rubric of an implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose which, in the case of residential real estate, is, of course, habi-
tation. See Aronsohn v. Mandara, 484 A.2d 675, 681 (N.J. 1984) ("Habitability is
synonymous with suitability for living purposes; the home must be occupiable.").
37. This is motivated by the trend of "consumerism." See, e.g., Kevin C.
Culum, Hidden-But-Discoverable-Defects: Resolving the Conflicts Between Real
Estate Buyers and Brokers, 50 MoNT. L. REv. 331, 332 (1989).
38. See, e.g., McDonald, 398 A.2d at 1283 (potable water supply is essential
to habitation); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314 (N.J. 1965) (hot
water system unreasonably dangerous); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554
(Tex. 1968) (dangerously defective fireplace and chimney). See also Elderkin v.
Gaster, 288 A.2d 771, 777 (Pa. 1972) ("without drinkable water, the house cannot
be used for the purpose intended.").
39. See, e.g., Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1963) (building in disre-
pair and placed for condemnation); Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co. Inc., 288 N.W.2d
95 (Wis. 1980) (uncapped well under home).
40. See, e.g., Wolford v. Freeman, 35 N.W.2d 98 (Neb. 1948) ("As is" clause
is not a bar to rescission based on seller's fraud); Loughrin v. Superior Court, 19
Cal. Rptr. 2d 161 (1993) ("As is" clause is not the equivalent to waiver of poten-
tial common-law misrepresentation claim. "As is" simply means that purchaser
accepts property in the condition visible or observable by him. "As is" clause will
not protect against claims of intentional misrepresentation, fraudulent conceal-
ment, or negligent concealment unrelated to the failure to inspect.).
The Uniform Commercial Code requires that if the deed contains an "as is
clause intended to defeat the implied warranty of habitability, it must so state in
conspicuous language. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1972). "Conspicuous" is defined as "a
term or clause ... so written that a reasonable person against whom it is to oper-
ate ought to have noticed it. A printed heading in capitals... is conspicuous.
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Until recently, implied warranty and duty to disclose cases have
almost invariably dealt with physical defects found on the premises:
a problem with the structure or with the land.4 Recent notable
exceptions have been the so-called "stigma" cases, where an "intan-
gible" defect reduced the desirability and therefore the property
value of the house. 2 In one infamous California case, it was held
that because the property's notoriety as the site of a grisly murder
had negatively affected its value, the failure to disclose the murders
was actionable.43
The ancient doctrine placing the burden on the buyer was applied
in modern times in Levy v. C. Young Construction Co.." In Levy,
Language in the body of a form is 'conspicuous' if it is in larger or other con-
trasting type or color." Id. § 1-201(10).
41. See Strawn II, 657 A.2d 420 (N.J. 1995).
42. See, e.g., Reed v. King, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1983) (Failure to disclose
house was notorious murder site); Stambovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672
(N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (failure to disclose house was haunted). See also, Paula C.
Murray, AIDS, Ghosts, Murder: Must Real Estate Brokers and Sellers Disclose?,
27 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 689 (1992).
43. Reed, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
44. Levy I, 134 A.2d 717 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957). For a general
treatment of caveat emptor see, E.B. Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home
Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did It, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 835, 837 (1967)
Caveat emptor... did not adversely affect the typical buyer of a new
house during the nineteenth century. In those days, after all, the home-
owner-to-be was commonly a middle-class fellow who purchased his
own lot of land and then retained an architect to design a home for
him. Once the plans were ready the landowner hired a contractor who
built a house according to the plans. Quality control was assured
because the builder was paid in stages as he completed each part of
the house to the satisfaction of the architect. If the house did happen
to collapse, the homeowner had a choice of lawsuits to recoup his
losses: either the plans were defective, in which case the architect had
been negligent, or the building job had not been workmanlike, in
which case the contractor was liable .... After World War II ... the
building industry underwent a revolution. It became common for the
builder to sell the house and land together in a package deal. Indeed,
the building industry outgrew the old notion that the builder was an
artisan and took. on all the color of a manufacturing enterprise, with
acres of land being cleared by heavy machinery and prefabricated
houses being put up almost overnight. Having learned their law by
rote, however, the lawyers tended to insist that caveat emptor nonethe-
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it was alleged that the builder had negligently laid a sewer pipe and
that its replacement was necessary.45 The court applied caveat
emptor and held that "[a]bsent any covenant binding defendant to
sell a well constructed house, plaintiffs cannot sue on an implied
warranty."'
The first incremental erosion of the doctrine in New Jersey came
in the case of Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc..' In Michaels, the
New Jersey Supreme Court stated that caveat emptor no longer
applied to leasehold interests in property, noting that in other juris-
dictions "[e]xceptions to the broad immunity [of caveat emptor
had] inevitably developed."" Thus, the landlord "owes a duty of
reasonable care with respect to the portions of a building which are
not demised and remain in-the landlord's control."'49
The more significant change in New Jersey law from vendor
immunity under caveat emptor came in a case involving a danger-
ous condition created by the builder. In Schipper v. Levitt & Sons,
Inc., a young child was severely scalded by hot water drawn
from a bathroom faucet.5' The home was part of a mass-develop-
ment that used a unique water heating system which forced ex-
tremely hot water through coils embedded in the concrete floors in
order to heat the living areas." The same boiler also supplied the
faucets in the kitchen and bathrooms with the same 190 degree
water, which was considered "excessively hot" or "scaldingly hot,"
compared with the normal domestic hot water temperature in the
area of 140 degrees.53 The builder had deliberately failed to install
less applied to these sales.
Id.
45. Levy I, 134 A.2d 717.
46. Id. at 719 ("Although the doctrine of caveat .emptor, so far as personal
property is concerned, is very nearly abolished, it still remains as a viable doc-
trine in full force in the law of real estate."), aff'd on other grounds, 139 A.2d
738 (1958).
47. 140 A.2d 199 (N.J. 1958).
48. Id. at 201.
49. Id.
50. 207 A.2d 314 (N.J. 1965).
51. Id. at 316.
52. Id. at 316-17.
53. Id. at 318.
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"mixing valves" in order to reduce the temperature of the tap water
to a safer level, despite specific recommendations of the boiler
manufacturer to do so.
54
Holding for the plaintiff, the court emphasized the "special and
concealed danger far beyond -any danger incident to contact with
normally hot water. '55 The defendant argued that the traditional
rule was to not imply a warranty,56 and further urged the court to
require a showing of privity between the injured child and the
builder.57 The defendant attempted to distinguish foreign cases that
had departed from caveat emptor as actions where no questions of
privity arose because they were suits by the purchaser directly
against the builder-vendor. The court dismissed this attempt to
54. Id.
55. Id. at 324.
56. Id. at 327 (citing 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 926 (Rev.ed. 1936)). The
Schipper court noted that although the 1936 edition of Williston's CONTRACTS
stated the traditional' rule, the 1963 edition of the same volume noted that the
trend was changing toward "an exception in the sale of new housing where the
vendor is also the developer or contractor" because the purchaser "relies on the
implied representation that the contractor possesses a reasonable amount of skill
necessary for the erection of a house; and that the house will be fit for human
dwelling." 7 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 926A at 810 (3d ed. 1963).
57. In this case, the infant was the child of a lessee not in privity with the
builder. Privity of contract is "the connection or relation which exists between
two or more contracting parties." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1199 (6th ed.
1990). Traditionally, the element of privity between the plaintiff and defendant
had been required in order to maintain an action on the contract. Id. See also,
Sean M. O'Brien, Caveat Venditor: A Case for Granting Subsequent Purchasers
A Cause of Action Against Builder-Vendors for Latent Defects in the Home, 20 J.
CORP. L. 525, 537-38 (1995) (noting the trend away from requiring privity).
58. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314, 326-27 (N.J. 1965).
Among the cases cited by the defendant builder were: Carpenter v. Donohoe, 388
P.2d 399 (Colo. Sup. Ct. 1964)
([T]he implied warranty doctrine is extended to include agreements
between builder-vendors and purchasers for the sale of newly con-
structed buildings, completed at the time of contracting. There is an
implied warranty that builder-vendors have complied with the [ar-
ea's] building code.... [T]here are implied warranties that the home
was built in workmanlike manner and is suitable for habitation.);
Gilsan v. Smolenske, 387 P.2d 260 (Colo. Sup. Ct. 1963); Jones v. Gatewood,
381 P.2d 158 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1933); Weck v. AM Sunrise Const. Co., 184
N.E.2d 728 (I11. App. Ct. 1962) (contract to purchase a house under construc-
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distinguish the other cases and noted that they "undoubtedly evi-
dence the just stirrings [in other jurisdictions] towards recognition
of the need for imposing on builder vendors an implied obligation
of reasonable workmanship and habitability which survives delivery
of the deed."59 However, the court added that to require privity in
real estate transactions would revive an old doctrine that was quick-
ly disappearing from the products liability area from which it first
arose.' Moreover, the current trend was towards a modem prod-
ucts liability approach that "held [builders] to the general standard
of reasonable care for the protection of anyone who might
foreseeably be endangered by their negligence, even after accep-
tance of the work."'"
Although Schipper involved a mass developer (which the court
compared to mass producers of consumer products), New Jersey's
implied warranty doctrine was extended to include-even small-scale
developers where the builder had failed to provide an adequate
water supply. In McDonald v. Mianecki,6" a small-scale developer
built a home for the plaintiffs on a lot the plaintiffs had selected.
The home was to be supplied with water from a well on the
property and the wellwater turned out to be unfit for drinking.63
Following foreign cases holding that a "potable water supply is
essential to any functioning living unit, ' ' the McDonald court
included the availability of drinkable water within the warranty in
New Jersey and explicitly extended its obligations to cover small-
tion carries with it an implied warranty of reasonable workmanship and habit-
ability which survives the deed); Hoye v. Century Builders, 329 P.2d 474
(Wash. Sup. Ct. 1958); Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, 2 K.B. 113 (1931). Also
cited were: Leo Bearman, Jr., Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent As-
saults upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REv. 541 (1961); Allison Dunham, Ven-
dor's Obligation as to Fitness of Land for a Particular Purpose, 37 MINN. L.
REv. 108 (1953).
59. 207 A.2d at 327.
60. Id. at 328.
61. Id. at 321 (citing Dow v. Holly Manufacturing Co., 321 P.2d 736 (Cal.
Sup. Ct. 1958)).
62. 398 A.2d 1283 (N.J. 1979).
63. Id. at 1285.
64. Id. at 1293-94; Lyon v. Ward, 221 S.E.2d 727 (N.C. App. 1976); Elderkin
v. Goster, 288 A.2d 771 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1972); House v. Thornton, 457 P.2d 199
(Wash. Sup. Ct. 1969).
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scale developers.65 The court reasoned that "regardless of whether
[the builder] can be labeled a 'mass producer', ... the purchaser
relies upon [the builder's] superior knowledge and skill, and [the
builder] impliedly represents that he is qualified to erect a habitable
dwelling. '
The next stage in moving the burden from the buyer to the seller
in New Jersey came in the form of protection for the buyer distinct
from the warranty of habitability - the duty on the part of sellers of
used homes to disclose known latent defects. In Weintraub v.
Krobatsch,67 the seller of a six-year-old home failed to disclose
that the property was infested by roaches, and in fact, may have ac-
tively concealed the infestation. Upon discovering the infestation
shortly before closing,69 the buyers attempted to rescind the con-
65. McDonald, 398 A.2d at 1294-95. New Jersey courts have also held the
implied warranty of habitability includes a defective septic system. Andreychak v.
Lent, 607 A.2d 1346 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992); Hermes v. Staiano, 437
A.2d 925 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1981); see also Trentacost v. Brussel, 412
A.2d 436 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1980) ("At a minimum, the necessities of a habitable
residence include sufficient heat and ventilation, adequate light, plumbing and
sanitation and proper security and maintenance.").
66. McDonald, 398 A.2d at 1292. The builder
is also in a better position to prevent the existence of major defects.
Whether or not engaged in mass production, builders utilize standard
form contracts, and hence the opportunity to bargain for protective
clauses is by and large nonexistent. Finally, it is the builder who has
introduced the article into the stream of commerce. Should defects
materialize, he-as opposed to the consumer purchaser-is the less inno-
cent party.
Id.; see also Linda M. Libertucci, Builder's Liability to New and Subsequent
Purchasers, 20 Sw. U. L. REv. 219, 220 (1991) ("In today's world of mass
production and specialization, the home purchaser simply cannot be expected
to have the detailed knowledge of homes acquired by those in the business.
Now the purchaser relies on the expertise of the builder-vendor.").
67. 317 A.2d 68 (N.J. 1974).
68. Id. at 69-70. The "concealment" took the form of brightly illuminating the
house during visits by the prospective buyers. Because roaches are nocturnal,
leaving the lights on effectively concealed their presence. Id. at 70.
69. The purchasers discovered the infestation when they visited the home at
night. Upon turning on the lights, they were "astonished to see roaches literally
running in all directions, up the walls, drapes, etc." Id. at 70.
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tract and the seller sued for the deposit held in escrow.7" The New
Jersey Supreme Court reversed the lower court's holding that the
purchasers were liable to the seller under the contract, stating that
"under modem concepts of justice and fair dealing," sellers were
under the duty to disclose material latent defects "known to them
but unknown and unobservable by the buyer."'"
These two modem doctrines, the duty to disclose and the warran-
ty of habitability, together represent a monumental shifting of the
burden in real estate transactions. This shift is a grand evolution in
the way real estate transactions are viewed by courts from the strict
doctrine of caveat emptor, to vastly more equitable72 rules based
on "modem concepts of justice and fair dealing. 73
Although the distinction between these two doctrines is less im-
portant than what they represent, at least for the purposes of this
Note, a brief discussion of their distinction is instructive in light of
their application to differing fact scenarios.
The distinction is a straightforward one. The implied warranty of
habitability arose under equitable contract principles.74 Because of
a superior bargaining position and surrounding policy reasons, the
builder/seller of a new home is said to impliedly warrant that the
home conveyed is suitable for habitation, whether he knows of any
defects or not.75 Any latent defects that exist in the new home due
to faulty construction may not obviate themselves until some time
after the new owner moves in. Here, the warranty protects the buy-
er if a poorly fitted pipe, which the builder may not know about,
fails after the buyer moves in causing her to incur curative expens-
es.
76
70. Id.
71. The holding in Weintraub was framed in the context of a reversal of a
motion for summary judgment in favor of the seller. The court held that in light
of "current principles grounded on justice and fair dealing," the buyer was enti-
tled to a full trial below. Id. at 80.
72. See O'Hara, supra note 16, at 160.
73. Weintraub, 317 A.2d at 75.
74. Libertucci, supra note 66, at 221.
75. See, e.g., Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314, 326 (N.J. 1965).
76. Cf Levy I, 134 A.2d 717 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957) (absent proof
that the vendor knew about defect, the purchaser could not recover if he had
accepted the deed without a construction warranty).
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For a used home, the owner/seller, who generally has lived in the
home, also has a pretty good idea of the property's condition and
whether latent defects exist. The duty to disclose such defects arose
under a fraud theory." In cases where one party has superior ac-
cess to information, mere silence may be the equivalent of an affir-
mative misrepresentation.7" Thus, the duty to speak arises and si-
lence under the duty is fraudulent.79
The distinction between the doctrines is important in one respect.
The duty to disclose latent defects may arise in some situations not
clearly covered by the warranty of habitability." This is because
there are some defects that may materially affect the value of the
home, while not substantially affecting its habitability. For example,
in the stigma cases from California"' and New Jersey,82 the infa-
mous nature of the sites materially affected the value of the proper-
ties, but probably didn't impair their habitability. 3 It is unlikely,
although conceivable, that a court would extend the warranty of
habitability to a case where the buyer's discovery of the home's
reputation psychologically affected him so much that residence
there would be unbearable.
The distinction is for the most part insignificant because courts
apply whichever doctrine will likely result in the protection of the
buyer.
PART Two:
A. The Modern Rule - Strawn v. Canuso
The final stage of this burden-shifting in the law is embodied in
77. Robert M. Washburn, Residential Real Estate Condition Disclosure Legis-
lation, 44 DEPAJL. L. REv. 381, 386-89 (1995).
78. See, e.g., Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 317 A.2d 68, 73 (N.J. 1974).
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., Strawn II, 657 A.2d 420 (N.J. 1995); Tobin v. Paparone Constr.
Co., 349 A.2d 574 (N.J. 1975); Landriani v. Lake Mohawk Country Club, 97
A.2d 511 (N.J. 1953).
81. Reed v. King, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1983).
82. Tobin v. Paparone Constr. Co., 349 A.2d 574 (N.J. 1975); Landriani v.
Lake Mohawk Country Club, 97 A.2d 511 (N.J. 1953).
83. It did not impair the habitability in the sense that the house was physically
adequate as a dwelling.
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the 1995 case of Strawn v. Canuso.84 The New Jersey Supreme
Court for the first time explicitly addressed the question of whether
there was a duty to disclose a condition occurring beyond the prop-
erty line of the subject property. Although other cases had previous-
ly addressed conditions that did not occur within the structure or on
the land which was the subject of the transaction,"5 this was the
first time the specific question of whether an off-site defect must be
disclosed was actually answered.
The Strawn plaintiffs were a certified class of more than 150
families who were recent purchasers of homes in a new develop-
ment built by the defendants, John B. Canuso, Sr. and Jr., and their
companies, Canetic Corporation and Canuso Management Corpora-
tion.86 Their marketing agent, Fox and Lazo, Inc. brokerage was
also named as a defendant.87 The plaintiffs brought suit upon
learning that their new homes had been constructed literally next
door to a closed, and leaking toxic waste dump, and after develop-
ing health problems88 generally associated with the proximity of
the dump.89
The toxic dump encompassed two tracts of land owned by RCA
and the Voorhees Township, known as the Buzby Landfill. Al-
though not licensed to accept liquid industrial or chemical toxic
waste, the dump was reported to the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection ("DEP") as having had received several
tanker trucks dumping liquid chemical waste." Furthermore, re-
cords show that the landfill operators had written to one of the
owners of the landfill, in 1971 and 1972, objecting to the delivery
of chemicals to the landfill for dumping." Numerous tests of
ground and surface water were conducted revealing heavy metal
and organic pollutants9 2 (including methane that had migrated
84. Strawn II, 657 A.2d 420 (N.J. 1995).
85. Tobin, 349 A.2d at 575; Landriani, 97 A.2d at 512.
86. Strawn II, 657 A.2d at 423.
87. Id.
88. The health problems that occurred were not considered in the court's
decision.
89. Strawn II, 657 A.2d at 423.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 424.
92. Id. at 423.
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more than 100 feet from the landfill's perimeter fence), placing it
within the backyards of some of the new homes. 93 A 1991 U.S.
Health and Human Services Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry report noted that a "stream containing hazardous
substances" from the landfill was indeed running through several
backyards in the development.94 As early as 1980, the U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency warned that if any homes were built
near the landfill, "[t]he potential for a future Love Canal existed at
this site."95
The defendant builder knew of the existence of the landfill while
it was still operational, before the homes were built, and was aware
of the potential health hazards.96 Indeed, the defendant broker's
marketing director urged the defendant builder to disclose the pres-
ence of the landfill to potential buyers.97
The Strawn plaintiffs alleged common-law fraud, negligent mis-
representations, and violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud
Act ("CFA").9' Although originally alleging breach of the warran-
ty of habitability, the plaintiffs voluntarily dropped this claim.99
The trial court dismissed all of the claims, holding that "there is no
duty that the owner of lands owe[s] ... to disclose to [the] pro-
spective purchaser the conditions of somebody else's proper-
ty." oo The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the duty ex-
isted, and the defendants appealed.'0 '
The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division,
holding that:
[A] builder-developer of residential real estate or a broker repre-
senting it, is ... liable for nondisclosure of off-site physical condi-
tions known to it and unknown and not readily observable by the
buyer if the existence of those conditions is of sufficient materiali-
ty to affect the habitability, use, or enjoyment of the property and,
93. Id. at 430.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 423.
96. Id. at 424.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 431 n.5 (the reason for this is unknown).
100. Id. at 424.
101. Id. at 424-25.
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therefore, render the property substantially less desirable or valu-
able to the objectively reasonable buyer.102
In deciding what the Appellate Division called the "novel is-
sues" raised by this case,"0 3 the New Jersey Supreme Court re-
lied on its precedents in Schipper, '" McDonald,°5  and
Weintraub"° to support the steady erosion of the caveat emptor
doctrine. It also relied on Berman v. Gurwicz °7 for the proposi-
tion that "[claveat emptor, the early rule, no longer prevails in
New Jersey."' 8 The court then noted that other jurisdictions
have limited the role of caveat emptor, citing California's rule
that
when the seller knows of facts materially affecting the value or
desirability of property and the seller also knows that such facts
are not known to, or within the reach of the diligent attention and
observation of the buyer, the seller is subject to the duty to dis-
close those facts to the buyer."
The question before the Strawn court was whether to extend
the Weintraub doctrine of the duty to disclose on-site latent de-
fects known only to the seller to off-site conditions, and if so, to
what extent."10
The court examined the latter question first, and determined
that only professional builder-vendors would be obligated to dis-
close off-site material latent conditions, thereby excluding from
the scope of the duty the resale of a home by its owner."' This
102. Id. at 431 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
103. Strawn v. Canuso, 638 A.2d 141, 144 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994)
[hereinafter cited as Strawn I].
104. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314, 326 (N.J. 1965).
105. McDonald v. Mianecki, 398 A.2d 1283, 1290 (N.J. 1979).
106. Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 317 A.2d 68, 75 (N.J. 1974).
107. 458 A.2d 1311, 1313 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981) (citing Weintraub,
317 A.2d 68), aff'd 458 A.2d 1289 (App. Div. 1983).
108. Strawn II, 657 A.2d at 427.
109. Strawn I, 638 A.2d 141 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (citing Lingsch
v. Savage, 29.Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984) (imposing duty on broker to inspect property
listed for sale to determine whether settlement or erosion problems are likely to
occur and to disclose such information to prospective purchasers)).
110. Strawn II, 657 A.2d at 428.
111. Id. at 428-29.
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limitation was based "on an assessment of the various policies
that have shaped the development of [New Jersey] law in this
area."'" 2 The factors shaping the duty to disclose in past cases,
the court stated, were the superior bargaining position of profes-
sional sellers (builder-vendors and their brokers), and their mark-
edly superior advantage in access to information about the subject
property."3 These factors led the court to conclude that it was
"reasonable to extend to such professionals a similar duty to
disclose off-site conditions that materially affect the value or
desirability of the property."'"
4
Of further significance, the court stated that the policies as well
as the law of the state Consumer Fraud Act ("CFA") applied to
professional builder-vendors and their brokers." 5 The CFA was
aimed at "the public harm resulting from '. . . unconscionable
practices engaged in by professional sellers seeking mass distribu-
tion of many types of consumer goods,"' 6 including real es-
tate."' Under its provisions, an omission may violate the statute
if the defendant acted knowingly"' in the "omission of any ma-
terial fact with intent that others rely upon such ... omission, in
connection with the sale ... of ... real estate."9 The CFA
does not confine "material fact" to conditions found only on the
premises. 2°
Although apparently finding it unnecessary to say so explicitly,
the New Jersey Supreme Court appears to have affirmed the
Appellate Division's decision to reverse the trial court's dismiss-
al of the Consumer Fraud claim. 2' As the Appellate Division
112. Id. at 428.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 429 (citing Arroyo v. Arnold-Baker & Assoc., 502 A.2d 106, 108
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985)).
116. Id. at 429 (citing DiBernardo v. Mosley, 502 A.2d 1166 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1986) and quoting Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 648 (N.J. 1971)).
117. Arroyo, 502 A.2d at 108.
118. Chattin v. Cape May Greene, Inc., 581 A.2d 91, 95 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1990), affd, 591 A.2d 943 (N.J. 1991).
119. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996).
120. Strawn II, 657 A.2d at 429.
121. See Strawn I, 638 A.2d 141 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
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stated, "[t]he [trial] court apparently reasoned that because there
was no duty to disclose the existence of the landfill, all omissions
with respect thereto would not violate the Act.""12 Since the Su-
preme Court found that a landfill can be a material fact,'23
which must be disclosed according to common law, 124 the Ap-
pellate Division's reversal of the trial court's finding, was im-
pliedly affirmed.
The court then explored the common law of fraudulent omis-
sions, in which a claim may be made "by showing that the sell-
er's.., nondisclosure of material fact induced the purchaser to
buy.' ' 25 The court cited cases where defendants had fraudulent-
ly failed to disclose facts material to the transaction, including
such things as a planned adjacent tennis court, 26 a separate
lease for a condominium complex's recreation area, 127 and the
prior federal convictions and disbarment of an applicant for a
rabbi position. 128 The court then stated that "[t]here'is no logical
122. Id. at 150-51.
123. Id. at 141.
124. Id.
125. Strawn II, 657 A.2d at 429.
126. Tobin v. Paparone Constr. Co., 349 A.2d 574, 578 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1975) (Defendant's silence created a "mistaken impression on the part of
the purchaser which operated to induce the purchaser to buy.").
127. Berman v. Gurwicz, 458 A.2d 1311, 1315 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981)
("It is clear.., that defendants had a duty to disclose to the buyers those materi-
als which materially and adversely affected [the buyers].... The existence of the
[separate] recreation lease, which imposed substantial financial burdens upon
buyers, was material and adverse.").
128. Jewish Ctr. of Sussex County v. Whale, 397 A.2d 712 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1978)
(The fact that no affirmative misrepresentation of a material fact has
been made does not bar relief. The suppression of truth, the
withholding of the truth when it should be disclosed, is equivalent to
the expression of falsehood. The question under those circumstances is
whether.,, the defendant is bound in conscience and duty to rec-
ognize that the facts so concealed are significant and material and are
facts in respect to which he cannot innocently be silent.)
(citation omitted), aff'd, 432 A.2d 521 (1981).
However, in Jewish Center, the court held that the defendant only com-
mitted "equitable fraud." In contrast to legal fraud, with equitable fraud the
plaintiff seeks only an equitable remedy (rescission or reformation) and is not
required to show scienter (knowledge and intention to obtain an undue advan-
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reason why a certain class of sellers and brokers should not dis-
close offsite matters that materially affect the value of proper-
ty. 1 2
9
Additionally, the court analyzed whether a nearby toxic waste
dump could qualify as a material condition that should be dis-
closed. It noted that "the physical effects of abandoned dump
sites are not limited to the confines of the dump,"'3 ° and that
"even without physical intrusion a landfill may cause diminution
in the fair market value of real property located nearby."'' Fur-
thermore, in late 1983, the New Jersey Real Estate Commission
wrote to the Camden County Board of Realtors, stating that
"[b]ecause of the potential effects on health, and because of its
impact on the value of property, location of property near a haz-
ardous waste site [sic] is a bit of information that should be sup-
plied to potential buyers."'32 Additionally, a real estate broker is
required under his state licensing guidelines to "make reasonable
effort[s] to ascertain all pertinent information concerning every
property for which he accepts an agency.... The licensee shall
reveal all information material to any transaction to his client or
principal and when appropriate to any other party."'33 The court
stated, that based on these sources, "professional sellers should
have been aware of some changing duty requiring them to be
more forthcoming with respect to conditions affecting the value
of property."1
34
The court undertook great pains to leave open the limits of
materiality of different off-site conditions under the new rule.'35
The court was further satisfied that on the facts of this case, the
plaintiffs had stated a cause of action.'36 Although, the court
tage therefrom). 432 A.2d at 524.
129. Strawn II, 657 A.2d at 430.
130. Id. at 430 (citing Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J.
1987) (toxics from a landfill contaminated the water supply of residents of nearby
homes)).
131. Strawn II, 657 A.2d at 430.
132. Id.
133. N.J. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 11, § 5-1.23(b) (1996).
134. Strawn II, 657 A.2d at 431.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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stated that they "need not debate the outer limits of the duty to
disclose,"'37 they later limited their statement:
We do not hold that sellers and brokers have a duty to investigate
or disclose transient social conditions in the community that argu-
ably affect the value of property. In the absence of a purchaser
communicating specific needs, builders and brokers should not be
held to decide whether the changing nature of a neighborhood, the
presence of a group home, or the existence of a school in decline
are facts material to the transaction. 3'
The court also noted the "stigma" cases from other jurisdic-
tions,'39 but specifically declined to address the materiality of
such conditions." Ultimately, the court stated, "a jury will de-
cide whether the presence of a landfill is a factor that materially
affects the value of property,... and whether the presence of a
landfill has indeed affected the value of plaintiffs' property."''
B. Why Did New Jersey Need the New Statute; What Was
Wrong With the Strawn Decision?
Early versions of the bill included a "Statement" in direct refer-
ence to the Strawn case.'42 This Statement indicated that the
137. Id. at 427.
138. Id. at 431.
139. Id. at 427 (citing Reed v. King, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1983) (holding that
property was stigmatized, and value negatively affected, by notoriety of home as
site of mass murder); Stambovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672 (holding that the
fact that house was haunted should have been disclosed) (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)).
140. Strawn II 657 A.2d at 427 n.l. The Strawn court also defined "stigmatized
property" as "property psychologically impacted by an event which occurred or
was suspected to have occurred on the property, such event being one that has no
physical impact of any kind." Id. See also Reed v. King, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130
(1983); Tobin v. Paparone Constr. Co., 349 A.2d 574 (N.J. 1975); Landriani v.
Lake Mohawk Country Club, 97 A.2d 511 (N.J. 1953); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF REALTORS, STUDY GUIDE: STIGMATIZED PROPERTY 2 (1990), quoted in Rob-
ert M. Morgan, The Expansion of the Duty of Disclosure in Real Estate Transac-
tions: It's Not Just for Sellers Anymore, FLA. Bus. J., Feb. 1994, at 31. Assum-
ing that the dumping of toxics qualifies as an "event," the question remains
whether the mere presence of a toxic dump in the neighborhood without any
contamination leaving the dump's boundaries, could "stigmatize" property.
141. Strawn II, 657 A.2d at 431.
142. 1995 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 253 (West).
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legislature was bothered by ambiguities in the decision: "The
New Jersey Supreme Court [has] found that sellers of residential
real estate had certain duties to disclose off-site conditions but
offered little guidance as to the extent of the duty or what is re-
quired to its satisfaction."143 Moreover, according to news ac-
counts, industry was pressuring the legislature to address the
Strawn holding.'"
There are several problems with the Strawn decision. First, the
duty to disclose conditions occurring beyond the property line ap-
pears to be nonexistent. Second, the extent to which the court
finds that a duty exists is unclear. Third, although the court at-
tempted to address the element of materiality, the issue has not
been adequately delineated.
The duty to disclose on-site material latent defects is already
the established law of New Jersey. 45 More specifically, sellers
must disclose "on-site defective conditions if those conditions
were known to them and unknown and not readily observable by
the buyer. Such conditions, for example, would include radon
contamination and a polluted water supply."' The facts recited
in the Strawn case indicate that the plaintiffs could have proven
at trial both (a) that the underground water supply and surface
soil were in fact contaminated, and (b) that the defendants were
aware of this fact and failed to disclose it.'47 Therefore, the
Strawn plaintiffs were likely to recover even without expanding
the duty to disclose off-site conditions.
Furthermore, a potable water supply is required by the implied
warranty of habitability in New Jersey.'" Although the plain-
tiffs inexplicably dropped this claim at the trial stage, the Strawn
court could have asserted in dicta that the claim was both valid
and probably would have been successful. 49 The record is un-
143. Id.
144. See Bruno Tedeschi, Know Thy Neighborhood; N.J. Requires Disclosure
of Hazards, THE NORTHERN NEW JERSEY RECORD, Sept. 24, 1995 at 4.
145. Strawn II, 657 A.2d at 428 (citing its own decision in Weintraub v.
Krobatsch, 317 A.2d 68 (N.J. 1974)).
146. Id. at 428.
147. Id. at 423-25.
148. McDonald v. Mianecki, 398 A.2d 1238 (N.J. 1979).
149. See Strawn I, 638 A.2d 141 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
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clear as to whether all of the homes in the class were affected by
the contaminated water supply, however, this is a fact issue for
the jury to decide.5
The Strawn court could also have substantively raised the war-
ranty issue sua sponte. The requirements for raising the issue are
either: (1) that the facts are sufficiently well developed such that
the question was purely legal, or (2) that the parties are not sur-
prised by the new issue. 5' A surprise may occur if the defen-
dant did not have the opportunity to defend against the charge at
trial. "' Here, the element needed to sustain a claim of the
breach of the warranty of habitability was the seller's failure to
provide a potable water supply.'53 Although, this might have
been an issue for the jury on remand, the Strawn court ignored
it154
This illustrates the fact that the Strawn court did not have to
extend the duty to disclose from on-site defects to off-site de-
fects. Moreover, in creating this new duty they failed to properly
delineate the nature and extent of the duty. The new duty is im-
properly delineated for three reasons: (1) whether there is a duty
150. State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 271 (N.J. 1987).
151. See, e.g., State v. Choice, 486 A.2d 833, 834-35 (N.J. 1985). In Choice,
the criminal defendant appealed the trial court's decision on the basis that the
trial court erred by not considering sua sponte the lesser included manslaughter
charge in the defendant's murder trial. The state Supreme Court, reversed the
intermediate appellate court's holding that clear error existed, and held that "[iut
is only when the facts 'clearly indicate' the appropriateness of that charge that
the duty of the trial court arises [to raise the new issue]." Id. at 835 (quoting
State v. Powell, 419 A.2d 406, 413 (N.J. 1980)). See also id. at 836
([W]here the... charge, if given sua sponte by the court, would
surprise the prosecution (or the defense), that unrequested charge
might be inappropriate; at the very least its use may require that op-
portunity be given to both sides to address the new issue... includ-
ing the opportunity to present further evidence.).
In Strawn, the well-documented contamination of the drinking water
"clearly indicated" that a habitability issue was appropriate. See Strawn I, 638
A.2d 141 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994). Furthermore, because Strawn was
remanded, the parties could further develop the facts to support or contest the
potability issue, or the existence of an alternative water supply.
152. See Choice, 486 A.2d at 835-36.
153. McDonald v. Mianecki, 398 A.2d 1238 (N.J. 1979).
154. See Strawn II, 657 A.2d at 431 n.5.
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to inspect the area for off-site conditions a buyer may deem "ma-
terial" in addition to a duty to disclose known defects remains
unclear; (2) the limitation to only professional builder-vendors
and their brokers is poorly founded; and (3) the question of mate-
riality is also extremely vague.'55
There is some question whether the court intended to create a
duty to investigate as well as a duty to disclose. The court's
holding specifically states that the seller need only disclose those
defects "known to [the seller yet] unknown and not readily ob-
servable by the buyer."' 156 However, other parts of the decision
indicate a duty to inspect as well.
First, much of the Appellate Division's opinion and, more
specifically, its holding, states that the seller has the duty to dis-
close material off-site defects that "are known or should have
been known to the seller."'57 Thus, impliedly, there is a duty to
inspect for those conditions. While the New Jersey Supreme
Court's holding does not include mention of the "should have
known" standard, it also does not specifically reject the Appellate
Division's language. The supreme court also cites favorably the
California case in which the broker's affirmative duty to conduct
a reasonable physical inspection of the premises as part of the
definition5 ' of the broker's duty to disclose was borne. "'59 The
155. See infra, notes 172-82 and accompanying text for a separate discussion
on the materiality question.
156. Strawn II, 657 A.2d at 428.
157. Strawn I, 638 A.2d 141, 149 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (emphasis
added).
158. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
159. Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 389 (1984)
Not only do many buyers in fact justifiably believe the seller's bro-
ker is also protecting their interest in securing and acting upon accu-
rate information and rely upon him, but the injury occasioned by such
reliance, if it be misplaced, may well be substantial.... [T]he duty
we adopt is supported ... also by the relative ease with which the
burden can be sustained by brokers .... [Indeed], [t]he Code of Eth-
ics of the National Association of Realtors includes ... the provision
that a broker must not only 'avoid ... concealment of pertinent
facts,' but 'has an affirmative obligation to discover adverse factors
that a reasonably competent and diligent. investigation would disclose.'
Id. (quoting National Assoc. of Realtors, Interpretations of the Code of Ethics,
Art. 9 (7th ed. 1978) (footnotes omitted)). The Easton court also noted Brady
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New Jersey Supreme Court then noted without further comment,
that three jurisdictions had "advanced the law of real estate be-
yond fraud to simple negligence by establishing an affirmative
duty to ... investigate the property for material defects."'"
The court also took pains to point out the "markedly superior
access to information" that builder-vendors and their brokers en-
joy. " The court found N.J.A.C. § 11.5-1.23(b) instructive. in
that it requires that a broker "make reasonable effort to ascertain
all pertinent information concerning every property for which he
accepts an agency .... "162 The court further stated that it did
"not hold that brokers have a duty to investigate or disclose tran-
sient social conditions," however, the context of the statement
clearly indicates that the court's emphasis on what it is excluding
as part of the duty is the part about "transient social conditions,"
and not the part about inspection. 6 3 The court never directly ad-
dresses the "investigate" issue, treating it impliedly, one might
argue, as a component of the duty to disclose."6
There are three ways to relate the duty to investigate to the
duty to disclose. One may say that there is merely the duty to
disclose what one already knows, with no duty whatsoever to
investigate. One might also say just the opposite, that the seller
has two distinct duties; to investigate for material conditions, and
then to disclose the results, if any, of that inspection. A third way
is to subsume the duty to investigate into the definition of the
duty to disclose, as the Appellate Division did when it included
the "or should have known" language in its holding.'65 This also
v. Carman, 3 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1960), in which the court held that the broker has
a duty to obtain information regarding a pertinent easement on the subject
property. Easton, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
160. Strawn II, 657 A.2d at 428 (quoting Sarah Waldstein, A Toxic Nightmare
on Elm Street: Negligence and the Real Estate Broker's Duty in Selling Previ-
ously Contaminated Residential Property, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 547, 551
(1988)).
161. Strawn II, 657 A.2d at 428.
162. Id. at 430-31.
163. Id. at 431.
164. See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
165. Strawn I, 638 A.2d at 146.
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is the tactic that California chose in Easton v. Strassburger'6
where the court stated that:
[t]he primary purposes of the [duty to disclose rules] are to protect
the buyer from the unethical broker and seller and to insure that
the buyer is provided sufficient accurate information to make an
informed decision whether to purchase. These purposes would be
seriously undermined if the rule were not seen to include a duty to
disclose reasonably discoverable defects. If a broker were required
to disclose only known defects, but not also those that are reason-
ably discoverable, he would be shielded by his ignorance of that
which he holds himself out to know .... Such a construction
would not only reward the unskilled broker for his own incompe-
tence, but might provide the unscrupulous broker the unilateral
ability to protect himself at the expense of the inexperienced and
unwary who rely upon him.... [Such a rule] would inevitably
produce a disincentive for a seller's broker to make a diligent
inspection. 67
In either case, whether the supreme court meant to impliedly
adopt the Appellate Division's broader rule or to limit it to those
conditions in which the seller/broker has actual knowledge, (given
the trend of shifting the burden in this area of the law from the
buyer to the seller) the writing was probably on the wall for the
real estate industry. Strawn's vagueness on this point only served
to reinforce the industry's fears and ultimately led to the passage
of the new Statute. 6
8
Apart from this lack of clarity as to the scope of the profes-
sional seller's duty, the limitation of the duty solely to profes-
sional sellers of new homes appears to be poorly founded. The
court bases the distinction on the "policies that have shaped the
development of the law in this area.' ' 169 These "policies" include
the fact that the professional builder-vendor and her broker have
"markedly superior access to information" about the property and
surrounding area, and thus "enjoy superior bargaining position"
over the new home buyer. 7 Although this is undoubtedly true,
166. Easton, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
167. Id. (emphasis added).
168. See supra Part I for a discussion on this trend.
169. Strawn II, 657 A.2d at 428.
170. Id.
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it is difficult to imagine why the same is not true about an owner
selling a used home. Certainly, the home owner has superior
knowledge about the on-site conditions, and superior knowledge
is precisely why the duty to disclose on-site conditions exists.'71
It is unclear why the owner of a home would not have more in-
formation, or even be substantially less likely to have more infor-
mation about the surrounding area as well.
The issue is given more weight if the Strawn rule is construed
narrowly to exclude the duty to investigate. The superior access
to information that the professional builder-vendor enjoys pre-
sumes that the professional will actually use that superior access
to information and make an adequate inspection of off-site condi-
tions. Even, if the duty to investigate is rejected, there does not
appear to be a good reason to immunize the seller of a used
home from liability for failing to disclose facts which he already
knew, even if they concern off-site conditions.
The uncertainty created by the lack of a clear rule on the duty
to investigate is amplified by the "little guidance"'72 the court
gave on what qualifies as a "material" off-site condition. It
should be noted immediately- that the court could easily have
limited its holding to the facts before it - only covering nearby
toxic landfills, instead of using the more general "off-site physi-
cal conditions ... of sufficient materiality" language.' The
fact that it chose the more open-ended rule probably reflects a
desire by the court to continue the steady expansion of the doc-
trine of the duty to disclose in the context of off-site defects.'74
Furthermore, given what one might argue were the egregious
facts of this case, the court may have felt compelled to use a
more sweeping rule. 7'
The only apparent limitation the court in Strawn had in mind
was that the defect be of a fixed physical nature'76 (e.g. a land-
171. Id.
172. See McDonald v. Mianecki, 398 A.2d 1238 (N.J. 1979) and discussion
supra Part II.
173. Strawn II, 657 A.2d at 431.
174. See supra Part I.
175. These facts are "egregious" because Defendant Strawn, Sr. knew of the
health risks involved in putting homes at that site, and was even urged to disclose
the landfill's presence by one of his co-defendants. Strawn II, 657 A.2d at 423.
176. Strawn II, 657 A.2d at 431. The court's treatment of the issue implies
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fill) and that it must "affect the habitability, use, or enjoyment of
the property and, therefore, render the property substantially less
desirable or valuable to the objectively reasonable buyer.' 77
Thus, it excluded "transient social conditions .... the changing
nature of a neighborhood, the presence of a group home, [and]
the existence of a school in decline" which might arguably also
affect the value of property.'
The court's logic is difficult to follow. It is easy to imagine
the named conditions affecting the use or enjoyment of the prop-
erty. Furthermore, recall that the court took note that the mere
presence of a nearby landfill can "materially" lower property
value, even if no contamination migrates onto the subject proper-
ty. 179 If one supposes that the presence of a well-contained land-
fill in the neighborhood, reduces the area property values by ten
percent merely because of residents' perceptions about the land-
fill's potential future threat, (presumably a perception that may
be shared by a jury), that would probably qualify as "material"
under the Strawn analysis.'8 ° Why, one might ask, is the same
not true if the off-site condition were for example, a gang-infest-
ed high school (a "school in decline," to use the Strawn lan-
guage'8 '), rather than a landfill?
Ultimately, the materiality question is an issue for the jury, but
the court's confusing language leaves open more questions than
it answers. Combined with the confusion as to the duty to investi-
gate, the unclear standard of materiality, and the clear trend to-
ward greater seller liability, juries may be charged with wide
latitude when deciding questions of whether the duty to disclose
was breached by a builder-vendor. It is not surprising, then, that
the industry appealed to the legislature for relief.'2
that the off-site condition must in some sense be a substantial presence in the
neighborhood. See discussion infra Part II.
177. Strawn II, 657 A.2d at 431.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 430. ("[Olur precedent and policy offer reliable evidence that the
value of property may be materially affected by adjacent or nearby landfills.")
180. Id.
181. Id. at 431.
182. See Tedeschi, supra note 3.
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PART THREE: THE LEGISLATIVE REACTION
A. The New Statute
The reaction to the Strawn decision produced the New Residen-
tial Construction Off-Site Conditions Disclosure Act (the "Stat-
ute").83 Although other states have residential disclosure stat-
utes,184 New Jersey's is the only one to expressly address off-
site defects. For example, California's comprehensive real prop-
erty transfer disclosure law requires only the disclosure of "neigh-
borhood noise problems or other nuisances.'1
8 5
The New Jersey Statute creates an entirely new mechanism for
informing buyers of material off-site defects. It does this by first
defining precisely what the Strawn court left ambiguous, includ-
ing what an "off-site condition" may include: 86
1. Sites listed on the National Priority List pursuant to the Federal
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act; 7
2. Sites known to and confirmed by the state Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection and listed on the New Jersey master list of
known hazardous discharge sites; 1
8
3. Overhead electricity transmission lines carrying 240,000 volts or
more;
4. Electrical transformer substations;
183. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3C (West 1996).
184. See, e.g., Illinois Residential Real Property Disclosure Act, 765 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 77/1-99 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996); Disclosures upon transfer
of real property, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102 (West 1982 & Supp. 1996).
185. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102.6 (West 1982 & Supp. 1996). This disclosure is
listed in a "Real Estate Transfer Disclosure Statement" form that the seller is
required to fill out and deliver to the buyer at the time of contract execution.
"Contract execution" is defined as "the making or acceptance of an offer."
§ 1102.2. The California statute is not meant to abridge or limit any other legal
"obligation for disclosure . . in order to avoid fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit
in the transfer transaction." Id. § 1102.8.
186. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3C-3 (West 1996).
187. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1995).
188. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10-23.15 (West.1992).
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5. Underground gas transmission lines; 9
6. Sewer pump stations with capacity of 500,000 gallons or more
per day and sewer trunk lines larger than 15 inches in diameter;
7. Sanitary landfill facilities;"
8. Public wastewater treatment facilities; and
9. Airport safety zones. 9'
However, mere evidence of these "conditions" is not enough;
they must also "materially affect the value of the residential prop-
erty.' 92
With a novel recording scheme the Statute creates a public
repository of lists of the types of "conditions" that occur through-
out the state. 93 It requires "any person who owns, leases, or
maintains" any of types (3), (4), (5), (6), or (8) of the listed off-
site conditions to provide the local municipal clerk's office with
the location and type of each off-site condition.'94 The State
Commissioner of Environmental Protection is to provide informa-
tion with regard to types (1), (2), and (7)95 The Statute does
not mention who will provide information as to type (9); presum-
ably the presence of an airport will obviate itself. The municipal
clerk, is then required to "receive and make available.., lists
identifying the location of off-site conditions existing within the
boundaries of the municipality."' 96
189. As defined in 49 C.F.R. § 192.3 (1995).
190. As defined pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:lE-3 (West 1991 & Supp.
1996).
191. As defined pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 6:1-82 (West 1996).
192. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3C-3 (West 1996). The precise level at which de-
preciation in value becomes "material" is again left open, presumably for the
jury. Yet, only these enumerated "conditions" may open the issue for the juiy's
consideration. Id.
193. Id.
194. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3C-5-6 (West 1996).
195. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3C-6 (West 1996).
196. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3C-4 (West 1996). An earlier version of the bill
used the language "compile and maintain" instead of "receive and make avail-
able" and provided for maps of the off-site conditions. See 1995 N.J. Sess. Law
Serv. 253 (West).
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The "duty to disclose off-site conditions," is not the duty to
disclose the presence of the actual condition, but to inform the
buyer that the lists of conditions are available at city hall.'97
This is done through a form notice provided to the buyer "[a]t the
time of entering into [the] contract."'98 The notice includes the
disclosure of lists of off-site conditions in the same municipality
as the subject property, as well as municipalities within a half-
mile of the property.' The notice must include a list of the ad-
dress(es) and telephone number(s) of the municipalities and the
offices where the lists are available.2" It also notifies the pur-
chaser that he has five business days after contract execution to
send a notice of cancellation of the contract to the seller, other-
wise losing the right to cancellation."'
The notice also cautions purchasers to exercise "all due dili-
gence" to obtain more, or more recent, information relevant to
their decision to buy.2' It further "encourages" buyers to under-
take their own investigation of the general area around the prop-
erty to become familiar with any other conditions that might
affect the property's value. 3
The seller's provision of the notice to the buyer is deemed to
fully satisfy his disclosure duties as to off-site conditions. 4
This is true even if the lists have yet to be sent to the municipal
clerk, if the municipal clerk has yet to receive and make the lists
available, or if there is any error, omission, or inaccuracy in the
lists as received and made available by the municipal clerk.0 5
197. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3C-8 (West 1996).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. In fact, the Statute provides that no seller is required to compile or
contribute to the lists to be made available by the municipal clerk, N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 46:3C- 11 (West 1996), unless otherwise required to do so by N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 46:3C-5 (West 1996) as a condition of completeness or approval pursuant
to the Municipal Land Use Law, 1975 N.J. Laws c.291, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:55D-1, or any other law, rule, or regulation adopted pursuant thereto. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 46:3C- 11 (West 1996).
203. Id.
204. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3C-10 (West 1996).
205. Id.
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Hence, the seller is relieved of liability," 6 since the furnishing
of the form notice is a defense to any claim that the seller failed
to disclose any off-site conditions. 7
B. The Statute's Effect on the Seller/Buyer Relationship
The Statute, like Strawn itself, suffers from a variety of flaws.
Most importantly, the Statute is extremely seller-oriented and
equally as vague as Strawn in several important respects. Most
ironically, it probably would not have had a dispositive effect on
the Strawn case because Strawn was overreaching and created a
rule that was unnecessary for plaintiffs to prevail.2 8 Further-
more, the Statute may not reach all the cases it is meant for,
leaving builder-sellers liable for certain instances of nondisclo-
sure. On the other side of this coin, it may function as a shield
for bad-faith sellers to avoid liability for poor, even tortious,
business decisions.
There are four basic reasons why the Statute probably would
not have had any dispositive effect on the Strawn case itself.
First, the Statute explicitly limits its own scope to "off-site condi-
tions."' Latent, on-site defects would still require direct"'
disclosure by the seller.2"' The Strawn plaintiffs could still have
prevailed on a common-law fraudulent nondisclosure claim be-
cause their actual property and water supply were contaminat-
ed.2 12
Second, due to this contamination, the plaintiffs could also
have pursued a warranty of habitability claim. If they could prove
that the groundwater contamination rendered the water unpotable,
the plaintiffs would have prevailed even with the Statute in effect
because this on-site contamination would probably still leave the
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See Strawn II, 657 A.2d 420 (N.J. 1995), and discussion supra Part II.
209. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3C-2 (West 1996).
210. Direct disclosure is distinguished from the indirect disclosure obtained by
compliance with the statute.
211. Strawn II, 657 A.2d at 426 (N.J. 1995).
212. McDonald v. Mianecki, 398 A.2d 1283 (N.J. 1979).
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Strawn defendants liable. 3
Third, Strawn suggests that by mentioning certain positive off-
site amenities and failing to mention the off-site defects214 the
defendants violated the state Consumer Fraud Act.25 It is a vio-
lation of the Act to knowingly "omi[t] [a] material fact with the
intent that others rely on such omission" in connection with the
sale of real estate.21 ' The Strawn defendants had used promo-
tional brochures and advertisements to portray "the development
as located in a peaceful, bucolic setting with an abundance of
fresh air and clean lake waters ... [noting its proximity to]
malls, country clubs and train stations," without mentioning the
landfill's presence.217 Furthermore, it is clear on the record that
the defendants knew of the landfill and its potential for adversely
affecting the plaintiffs' health and safety." 8 Thus, even if the
new Statute had been in effect, the Strawn plaintiffs would proba-
bly have been able to sustain a Consumer Fraud claim. They
could have argued that once the seller. made particular off-site
conditions part of the inducement to buy, and knowingly omitted
other material off-site conditions, the sellers were estopped from
claiming their full disclosure duties were satisfied because they
were engaging in an unfair sales practice violative of the Con-
sumer Fraud Act.2"9 Such a defense based on the new Statute, if
it were allowed, would countenance just the sort of "sharp prac-
tices" the Consumer Fraud Act has as its essential purpose to
eliminate.
Finally, even with the Statute in effect, the Strawn plaintiffs
213. Id.
214. Strawn II, 657 A.2d at 429.
215. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 (West 1996).
216. The Statute specifically states that no other New Jersey statutory provision
is abridged by its provisions. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3C-10(d) (West 1995). Thus,
a Consumer Fraud action would still be viable, even as to off-site conditions. Id.;
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (West 1995).
217. Strawn II, 657 A.2d at 429.
218. Id. at 423.
219. Id. at 429 (citing Tobin v. Paparone, 349 A.2d 574 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law.
Div. 1975)).
220. Channel Cos., Inc. v. Britton, 400 A.2d 1221, 1221 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1979) ("[L]egislative concern was the victimized consumer, not the occa-
sionally victimized seller.").
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might have prevailed under a claim of common-law fraudulent
nondisclosure as to off-site conditions for the same reasons that
the Consumer Fraud action would probably succeed. If the defen-
dants' nondisclosure "created a mistaken impression on the part
of the purchaser which operated to induce the purchaser to buy,"
then that silence was a fraudulent misrepresentation.2 1 The Stat-
ute however, makes this scenario problematic because it explicitly
states that the form notice is to serve as a defense to any claim
that an off-site condition was not disclosed,222 and compliance
with the Statute's provisions is deemed to be full disclosure as to
off-site conditions. 3 The Statute is geared to answer the prima-
ry Strawn holding which creates an absolute duty to disclose off-
site material conditions, whether or not the defendants made any
representations or selective omissions as to such off-site condi-
224tions.
The absolute duty to disclose ought to be distinguished from a
case where the seller "create[s] a mistaken impression" about the
off-site environment by mentioning its positive aspects and failing
to mention the negative ones. 25 The plaintiffs could raise the
same kind of estoppel claim as in the Consumer Fraud action:
once the defendants induced the plaintiffs to purchase by men-
tioning the positive off-site conditions and knowingly omitting
the negative conditions, the defendants were estopped from claim-
ing that their off-site disclosure duties were fully satisfied.226
Nevertheless, whether common-law fraud under silence as an
inducement to purchase would be found to fall outside the scope
of the Statute is unclear.
Aside from the fact that it probably would have had no disposi-
tive effect on the Strawn case, the Statute is presumably seller-
oriented because of the Statute's notification procedure.
The Statute's Notification Regarding Off-Site Conditions2 7
could potentially shield a bad-faith seller from liability, if the
221. Strawn II, 657 A.2d at 429 (quoting Tobin v. Paparone, 349 A.2d 574).
222. See infra note 240 and accompanying text.
223. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3C-10 (West 1996).
224. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3C-10 (West 1996).
225. Strawn II, 657 A.2d at 429.
226. Tobin v. Paparone, 349 A.2d 574, 580 (N.J. Supr. Ct. Law Div. 1975).
227. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3C-8 (West 1996).
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seller buries the Notification in boilerplate language in the sales
contract or in the flood of documents at closing. Whereas, the
form notice is only a few paragraphs long and includes the "due
diligence" language,228 the Statute contains no conspicuousity
requirement." The seller is required to give the buyer the form
notice "at the time of entering into a contract," 230 however, the
meaning of this provision is unclear. The "enter[ed] into" lan-
guage suggests a binding effect in which the seller must give
notice at the time the offer is given and accepted, at the contract
signing, or at closing. Whichever it might be, the "enter[ed] into"
language suggests that the negotiations have ceased, and the price
and other terms have been set. At that junction the off-site condi-
tions are not part of the negotiation and price-setting process.
Furthermore, the Statute provides only five days for the pur-
chaser to make her investigation at city hall, exercise her "due
diligence" to find more recent information, and then if necessary,
cancel the contract.23 ' The seller's advantage in the transaction
is enhanced if he withholds information from the buyer until she
is committed to the deal. Only two options remain for the buyer:
accept the prior terms after the off-site conditions become known
to her or cancel the contract entirely. In addition to being highly
seller-oriented in this respect, the Statute may not even protect a
good-faith seller whose actions were negligent rather than
fraudulent.
For off-site "material conditions," including sites like the
Buzby landfill,232 the Statute's express purpose is to bar an ac-
tion grounded in fraud, so long as the presence of the lists is
disclosed, and no other representations are made about the off-site
228. See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
229. Compare this with the U.C.C. Sale of Goods provisions requiring that
sales contracts which modify the implied warranty of fitness have such language
be both explicit (using the precise term "warranty of fitness") and conspicuous
(using italics or bold type). U.C.C. § 2A-214 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996).
230. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3C-8 (West 1996).
231. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3C-9 (West 1996).
232. It is unclear whether the Statute's inclusion of "sanitary landfills" would
be interpreted to include a closed, buried dump or only a facility still in opera-
tion.
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conditions.233 A common law action of fraudulent nondisclosure
equates silence under the duty to disclose with an affirmative
misrepresentation.2 ' However, since the Statute specifically de-
fines "duty" in this context as the duty to disclose the location of
the lists, once that disclosure is made there is no fraudulent non-
disclosure. 35
The statute may not bar an action in negligence where the
seller is claimed to have negligently failed to discover the materi-
al off-site defect in the first place; 236 a case, in other words,
where the seller "should have known." To draw an on-site anal-
ogy, if a developer failed to inspect the soil properly and the
houses sank into an undiscovered fill, it would be correct to say
that it was negligent to place the houses on unsuitable soil; it
would be incorrect to say that the developer failed to disclose that
the houses were placed on unsuitable soil.2 37 Using a prior off-
site example, even if a seller did not know that she built a hous-
ing development near the underground plume of a closed toxic
waste dump (until the buyers were in ill health and suing) she
would still be negligent in building the houses in that loca-
tion. 23 It would be incorrect to say however, that she did not
negligently fail to disclose the presence of the toxic waste dump
because she did not know about it.
In such a case, the negligence is centered on the placement of
the houses in the particular location. 39 Either the builder negli-
gently failed to inspect the entire area for the suitability of the
development (including the availability of a potable water sup-
ply240 or unstable fill), 4' or negligently carried out that
inspection. Under the negligence rubric, the seller's duty of care
233. See infra notes 219-225 and accompanying text.
234. Id.
235. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3C-10 (West 1996).
236. See, e.g., Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984).
237. Id.
238. For example, she would be negligent for failing to inspect the site for
suitability.
239. This negligence is measured by the standard of reasonableness. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1977).
240. McDonald v. Mianecki, 398 A.2d 1283, 1283 (N.J. 1979).
241. Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984).
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is to disclose all material conditions which are known or "should
have been known to seller., 242 In other words, her duty is to in-
spect and disclose the results of that inspection. In the above
example, the breach of the duty is the failure to inspect properly.
The statute specifically exempts sellers243 from any duty to in-
spect for off-site defects,2" but does not protect a seller who
could be said to have negligently chosen a particular site.245
The Statute would probably reach the case where the builder
makes the inspection but negligently fails to communicate the
results of the inspection. This could occur, for example, where
the builder confuses or loses the site records. Here the negligence
duty was breached when the seller failed to disclose the results of
the inspection. Assuming arguendo that the statutory requirements
were met, an action on the negligent failure to disclose the results
of the inspection would be barred by the Statute.24 Note, how-
ever, that such a case would look very much like fraudulent non-
disclosure, not mere negligence.247
As noted above, the Statute also probably does not reach a
Consumer Fraud action.2' The New Jersey Consumer Fraud
Act is designed to abolish unfair sales and advertising practic-
es. 49 An action under the Consumer Fraud Statute, therefore,
arises when the seller uses unfair sales practices such as the use
of advertisements and promotional materials that speak of posi-
242. Strawn II, 657 A.2d 420, 424-425 (N.J. 1995).
243. The statute also exempts a broker selling a new house under the same
circumstances. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3C-5, 10, 11 (West 1996). There is
negligence in the failure to discover the condition, not the failure to disclose it.
244. The owner/manager of the listed kinds of off-site conditions also has the
"duty to inspect." Id. See also, id. § 3C-12. Note that if the statute were interpret-
ed to include such cases, or if it were explicitly amended to do so, it would ef-
fectively reduce the duty of the developer to ensure that houses belong where she
intends to put them.
245. Note that this is very similar to the earlier warranty of habitability exam-
ple. See discussion supra Part II. For example, if the seller negligently failed to
discover the underground toxic plume, and as a result the water supply turned out
to be unpotable, the seller would not be protected by the Statute.
246. See supra Part II B. for a discussion on scope and satisfaction of duty.
247. See supra Part III for a discussion on nondisclosure.
248. Strawn II, 657 A.2d at 420.
249. See supra text accompanying note 166.
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tive, property value-enhancing off-site conditions, but fails to
disclose the negative off-site conditions. 5 °
The Statute also suffers from one of Strawn's major defects:
vagueness. This is true in two respects. First, the Statute lists
what may be included as an off-site material condition, and adds
that these conditions must "materially affect the value of the
residential . ... property. 2 1' However, the Statute does not de-
fine what amount of diminution in value is considered "material."
Second, the "due diligence" duties of buyers are referred to in
several places within the Statute. 2 In the form Notification, the
Statute "encourages" buyers to "exercise all due diligence to
obtain any additional or more recent information that they believe
may be relevant in their decision to purchase the residential real
estate." 3 No case in New Jersey was found to explain what
"due diligence" in this context was supposed to mean. The Stat-
ute provides no guidance on whether "due diligence" includes a
phone call, a record search beyond the Statute lists, or a physical
inspection of the surrounding area. The only New Jersey case that
discusses the duty of a buyer to inspect the premises holds that
the buyer who failed to inspect at all could still recover for latent
material defects.25
4
Furthermore, in light of the steady erosion of the doctrine of
caveat emptor, where sellers are liable for all on-site latent de-
fects, the "due diligence" responsibilities of buyers at modem
common law are limited to inspection for patent defects - those
250. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1 to -66 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996). The
Consumer Fraud statute is analogous to the common law fraud doctrine. Common
law fraud provides that once a seller elects to speak, he must speak the (entire)
truth. This is because the seller speaks of the positive off-site conditions to in-
duce the buyer into signing the sales contract. By making the off-site conditions a
material element within the transaction (if it didn't induce the buyer it wouldn't
be material), the seller acts unfairly by not disclosing all of the off-site condi-
tions, including those that affect the property negatively. This differs from the
case where the seller has an absolute duty to disclose the presence of a landfill,
even if off-site conditions are not disclosed. Id.
251. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3C-3 (West 1996).
252. Id. § 3C-2,8.
253. Id. § 3C-8.
254. Levy v. C. Young Constr. Co., 134 A.2d 717, 720 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1957).
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readily observable by a layperson. 5 In Tipton v. Nuzum, the
condition at issue was a leaky basement. 6 The court found that
"the existence of a sump pump and the fact that a hill slopes to-
ward the house" were sufficiently obvious conditions such that it
was the buyer's obligation to "(1) make further inquiry of the
owner... or (2) seek the advice of someone with sufficient
knowledge to appraise the defect." '257 Essentially, the court ruled
that these elements rendered the leaky basement a patent defect,
making it the buyer's responsibility to discover.
Therefore, common law "due diligence" for off-site defects
would also be limited to the buyer's duty to inspect for patent,
readily observable defects. Presumably, neither a buried, closed
toxic landfill, nor underground and groundwater contamination
would be deemed patent, and would probably fall outside the
"due diligence" responsibilities of the buyers as they relate to off-
site conditions.~
It is further plausible that the term "due diligence" is, in this
context, a legally meaningless admonition to buyers that is meant
to cast the psychological burden of the dead doctrine back to the
buyer.
Finally, the Statute offers little protection to a buyer who relies
on incomplete or inaccurate lists at city hall. There is no cause of
action available to the buyer against an owner or manager of an
off-site condition who fails to provide information about the
condition to the municipal clerk as required by the Statute. The
only cause of action available to a buyer is against the municipal-
ity or the DEP if either withholds or omits facts about the off-site
conditions causing damage to the buyer. 9 However, since the
plaintiff is required to prove that the DEP or municipality know-
ingly or intentionally omitted or withheld the facts,"6 the buyer
is left without recourse, if he cannot prove the mens rea.
255. See Tipton v. Nuzum, 616 N.E.2d 265 (Ohio 1992).
256. Id. at 267.
257. Id. at 269.
258. See Strawn II, 657 A.2d 420, 426 (N.J. 1995) (suggesting items not readi-
ly observable by the buyer).
259. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3C-12 (West 1996).
260. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Overall, the Statute is a good way to disseminate the locations
of certain kinds of fixed environmental hazards to members of
the community. A critical weakness in the Statute is the ineffec-
tiveness of the Notification procedure. First, the duty for the
broker is fulfilled in a mere two-paragraph notification, that is
potentially buried in the flood of documents at contract-signing,
or in boilerplate language within the contract itself.
Second, the buyer who was unaware of his "due diligence"
duties as to off-site conditions is now saddled with the burden.of
inspection. This is a classic example of caveat emptor, at least in
the "beyond the property line" context.
The Statute's essential purpose is to provide a specific medium
for notifying buyers of the locations of certain material off-site
conditions. If the Statute fails to effectively do this, all is for
naught. The Statute should be amended to require an oral disclo-
sure from seller to buyer, or a printed conspicuousity requirement
so that the buyer is truly and effectively notified of the
availability of the lists. In addition, a requirement to disclose at a
date earlier than "the time the contract is entered into," would
allow that information to be part of the negotiation process.
Currently, the Statute is biased to protect sellers by requiring
the disclosure at a time when all negotiations have ceased and the
terms have been set. Furthermore, it only provides five days for
the buyer to go down to the municipal clerk's office, look up the
lists, weigh the information, and cancel the contract. The notifica-
tion should be made in the same promotional materials or oral
disclosures that inform buyers of other material points of the
transaction.
Ironically, even though the Statute's reach may not extend as
far as the legislature intended, or even to the specific case that in-
spired it, it has the effect of reviving the ancient doctrine of
caveat emptor. Caveat emptor was killed in the modem context
for a reason; it is unfair to buyers.
Ultimately, this statute was made necessary by a vague and
poorly written court decision. The resultant clamor by industry
interests to the legislature for relief from a vague and flawed
common law decision begat a flawed and vague statute. In one
fell swoop, it eliminates a newly-created bit of common-law con-
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sumer protection and effects a revival of a dead doctrine.
If the Statute were amended to fix some of its flaws, most
notably the Notification procedure, it would be a workable solu-
tion to a real and emerging problem. By infusing more informa-
tion into the sales transaction, both parties will be able to deal
with one another more effectively and fairly, undeniably reducing
post-transaction litigation.
